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Bushmeat hunting is perceived as a serious threat to the conservation status of
many species in Africa. We use a novel livelihood choice experiment method
to investigate the role of illegal hunting within livelihood strategies in the west-
ern Serengeti, and to identify potential trade-offs between illegal hunting and
other income sources. We find that increasing access to microcredit, higher
wages, increases in number of cows, weeks hunting and increased access to
market all contribute to well-being. We are able to quantify the trade-offs be-
tween weeks spent illegal hunting and increases in cattle, wage income, access
to markets, and access to microcredit. However, important differences emerge
in response to these variables between different wealth groups which shape
how we should design conservation and development interventions.
Introduction
Hunting of wildlife is believed to be a key driver of serious
population declines and local species extinctions in many
parts of the world (Hofer et al. 1996). Hunting for bush-
meat is particularly critical in Africa, and the link between
the decline of wildlife populations and hunting has been
studied extensively (Wilkie & Carpenter 1999; Robinson
& Bennett 2000; Brashares et al. 2001). In this article,
we investigate the alternative contributions to well-being
that can replace returns from illegal hunting, and quan-
tify the changes in these factors which would be needed
to reduce hunting activity while maintaining livelihoods.
Previous studies have expressed concern about
the scale of illegal hunting in protected areas such
as the Serengeti National Park in Tanzania. Estimates
of the number of wildebeest killed illegally annually
in the Serengeti vary from 40,000 (Mduma 1996) to
118,000 animals (Campbell & Hofer 1995), and con-
cerns have been raised about the sustainability of ille-
gal hunting practices and about impacts on nontarget
species (Arcese et al. 1995). Previous studies have rec-
ognized the need to investigate and understand the de-
terminants of hunting and bushmeat consumption as an
essential step in devising more effective policies to re-
duce unsustainable illegal hunting of wildlife (Campbell
et al. 2001; Johannesen 2005).
Evidence suggests that the majority of hunting in the
Serengeti National Park is carried out by local young
males and is primarily motivated by poverty and the
desire for cash income and food. Participation in ille-
gal hunting is thought to decrease as the numbers of
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livestock owned increase, and as access to alternative
means of generating income or acquiring protein increase
(Campbell et al. 2001; Loibooki et al. 2002; Holmern
et al. 2007, though also see Mfunda & Røskaft 2001).
Nielsen (2006, 2011) found that illegal hunting is linked
to wealth, larger family size, and lower levels of educa-
tion. Knapp (2007) found that no households engaged
in poaching reported having members in full-time em-
ployment compared to 20% employment in nonpoaching
households.
However, the extent and determinants of illegal hunt-
ing are still unclear (Knapp et al. 2010). Studies assess-
ing levels of poaching are usually based on four methods:
self-assessment of illegal hunting activity; arrest records
from anti-poaching units; dietary records to measure the
demand for bushmeat; and market data on bushmeat
sales (Crookes et al. 2005). Each one of these methods has
problems. Dietary surveys do not reveal who is hunting
or why. The use of arrest records to determine the poach-
ing level may tell most about the quality and extent of
antipoaching activity. Market data captures only part of
bushmeat supply, and it may be hard to correctly iden-
tify demand- and supply-side shifts. Finally, self-reported
levels of poaching coming from household surveys suf-
fer from under-reporting due to fear of repercussions
(St. John et al. 2011).
This article investigates potential trade-offs between il-
legal hunting activity and other sources of household
income using the choice experiment method. Based on
focus group work with local households, a number of
‘household livelihood attributes’ were identified and used
in an experimental design which combines alternative
levels of these attributes in choice tasks. The attributes
include time spent illegally hunting and the probabil-
ity of being arrested on a hunting trip. Therefore, our
choice experiment attenuated the reluctance of house-
holds to answer questions regarding their illegal activ-
ity, as, crucially, households were not directly questioned
about the sensitive issue of whether members were en-
gaged in illegal hunting. Time spent hunting was just one
of the activities/attributes, the levels of which had to be
traded-off when choosing among alternative livelihoods.
By estimating an econometric model of choice determi-
nants, it was then possible to quantify trade-off rates be-
tween livelihood attributes, keeping constant the level
of household well-being, to investigate how significant
these attributes were in choosing one livelihood over an-
other, and what changes in cattle and wages, for example,
would compensate households for a reduction in weeks
spent in illegal hunting. As far as the authors are aware,
this is the first time that the choice experiment method
has been used in this way.
Methods
Sampling procedure and area of study
We conducted our survey in six villages in western
Serengeti, located adjacent to the Serengeti National Park
and Lake Victoria, along the border of the Grumeti Game
Reserve. Bushmeat hunting is an illegal but widespread
practice in this area. Members of approximately
32 households per village were interviewed by two local
enumerators in each village, leading to an overall sam-
ple size of 200 households. All twelve enumerators were
thoroughly trained in the administration of the choice
experiments. The main survey was undertaken between
December 2010 and February 2011.
Choice experiment design
Choice experiments are a survey-based method for
investigating preferences and demand (Hanley &
Barbier 2009). Respondents are presented with a series
of choice alternatives, differing in terms of characteristics
(attributes) and their levels, and asked to choose their
most preferred. A full outline of this approach is provided
in the Supplementary Information. In this survey, we
asked respondents to select their most preferred “liveli-
hood options” among a range of alternatives presented to
them. Each livelihood option consisted of six attributes,
two of which related to illegal bushmeat hunting: the
amount of time (weeks) spent hunting and the chance of
arrest while hunting illegally. All attributes were chosen
after a series of focus groups with local communities and
were informed by the existing literature on likely drivers
of participation in illegal bushmeat hunting in Africa.
The six attributes were:
(1) Number of cows owned by the household. Cattle are a
means of accumulating wealth in western Serengeti.
The hypothesis is that more cows are preferred to
fewer cows, and that increases in cattle numbers
would increase household utility. The attribute has
four levels: no cows, 1 cow, 15 cows, and 30 cows.
(2) Wage rate. The respondent was asked to imagine that
one household member had a full-time job. The hy-
pothesis is that higher wages are preferred to lower
wages, and that an increase in wages increases the
utility associated with a livelihood option. There are
four wage levels: no job, 80,000 TZS (Tanzanian
Shilling) per month, 200,000 TZS per month, or
600,000 TZS per month (1,000 TZS = 0.5 EUR or
0.64 USD). At the time of writing, 600,000 TZS was
equivalent to the salary of a senior primary school
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Figure 1 Example of a choice experiment card used in the survey.
teacher—one of the few employment opportunities
available in the area.
(3) Access to microcredit. Microcredit groups are a reality
in some of the villages in our study area, and many
respondents were familiar with these programs. We
asked respondents to imagine that there could be
such a microcredit group in their village that their
households could obtain money from for small busi-
ness start-ups.
(4) Road to village centre accessible by lorry. Respondents
were asked to consider the existence of a good
road between the nearest town and the center
of his or her village, so as to facilitate access to
markets.
(5) Time spent hunting per year. The respondent was told
the following “Imagine that you or somebody else in
your household considered going bushmeat hunting
to sell the meat (not to eat it at home). We are going
to show you different options, for example, you (or
another person in your household) could go hunting
for 6 months altogether in one year, or 1 week, or
not at all. The time we mention here includes all the
trips made in one year, whether it’s one-night trips
or big trips.” This attribute had four levels: no hunt-
ing, 1 week, 2 months, and 6 months.
(6) Likelihood of being arrested per trip. Previous studies
have identified the perceived likelihood of arrest as
a determinant of hunting participation (Knapp et al.
2010). Enumerators read the following text to each
respondent “Imagine you or somebody else in your
household might be going for a bushmeat hunting
trip this year in a group of 10. You or somebody of
your group might get arrested. We will show you
different likelihoods of being caught (per trip). For
example, of the 10 people in this group on your
trip, two might be caught, or four.” The four levels
used in the experimental design were: nobody gets
caught, and one, two, or four individuals out of a
group of ten get caught. Because this attribute is only
meaningful given the decision to hunt, we interact it
with the hunting trip attribute described above in the
models estimated.
Every respondent was shown six livelihood choice
cards (Figure 1). Further description of the survey design
is contained in the Supplementary Information.
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Table 1 Multinomial logit model (MNL) results. The coefficients show
the effects on utility of changes in each attribute level on the average
respondent relative to the baselines of no cattle owned, no job, no access
to microcredit, no road access to market, no hunting and no risk of arrest
Attribute Coefficient Standard error
Number of cows = 1 0.3369b 0.1591
Number of cows = 15 0.9098a 0.1918
Number of cows = 30 1.2443a 0.1450
Wage from job = 8,000 TZS 0.7952a 0.1838
Wage from job = 20,000 TZS 1.0219a 0.2236
Wage from job = 60,000 TZS 1.7628a 0.2033
Access to microcredit 0.5482a 0.1022
Access to market 0.5462a 0.1162
Weeks spent hunting = 1 0.5667a 0.2029
Weeks spent hunting = 8 0.5516c 0.2960
Weeks spent hunting = 24 0.2582c 0.1499
Risk associated with a hunting trip −0.8178a 0.1768
Model properties
Log-likelihood −696.78738




a,b,cSignificance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels.
Results
We started the analysis with a simple multinomial logit
model (MNL) presented in Table 1. All attribute levels
were dummy-coded to allow for variable marginal utili-
ties associated with each. Preliminary examination of the
data showed that irrespective of model specification, re-
spondents were generally insensitive to increasing in the
likelihood of being caught. By this, we mean that higher
probabilities of being caught did not result in progres-
sively lower probabilities of a livelihood option being cho-
sen, so long as this probability was at least as high as the
lowest level in the design, namely, one individual in ten
being caught on a hunting trip. For this reason, this at-
tribute is modeled as a single dummy variable, signifying
a nonzero risk of being arrested when on a hunting trip.
As may be seen from Table 1, having more cattle, a
higher wage income, access to microcredit, and road
access to markets all appear to significantly increase
the average respondents’ utility, and so increases the
probability of choosing a livelihood alternative which
corresponds to better levels of these attributes. The risk
associated with hunting trips is evaluated as negative
and highly significant in explaining variation in choices.
Because the risk of being arrested is controlled for statis-
tically, the variables associated with 1, 8, and 24 weeks
spent hunting represent the benefit of hunting when
there is no risk of being caught. All of these coefficients
are positive, showing that the benefits associated with
illegal hunting are judged to be greater than the costs
of time and effort by respondents. We observe that the
longer the hunting trip is, the less preferred it is com-
pared to shorter trips. Since longer trips require more
time (i.e., are more costly in terms of other opportunities
foregone) and effort, and imply a higher risk of getting
injured by wild animals, the net benefit of a hunting trip
can decrease with length if the value of meat caught does
not increase proportionately faster. This may explain the
pattern observed in the choice data.
Based on the MNL model results presented in Table 1,
we are able to calculate respondents’ trade-off rates be-
tween different attributes, such as the amount of each at-
tribute the respondents would be willing to trade for the
benefits of 1 week of riskless hunting, maintaining their
utility (here, well-being) at the same level. These trade-
off rates are presented in column 2 of Table 4. The util-
ity from one week of hunting is equal to the economic
benefits from owning an additional 1.47 cows, or hav-
ing an additional 36,000 TZS per month income from a
job.1 This implies that increasing cattle by more than 1.47
cows, or wages by more than 36,000 TZS would suffice
to offset the benefits from one week of illegal hunting for
the average respondent. Having access to microcredit ap-
pears just as good as 0.85 hunting weeks per year, and
nearly as valuable as having road access to a market.
Finally, we note that the absolute value of the coeffi-
cient associated with the risk of being arrested is higher
than the coefficient associated with even a 1-week hunt-
ing trip. This result means that if the average respon-
dent had a choice, he would rather not go on even a 1-
week hunting trip as long as there is a positive probability
of being arrested. This observation is obviously not sup-
ported by continued occurrence of poaching in western
Serengeti. The reason for this is that in the MNL model,
we estimate coefficients of the utility function of an av-
erage respondent. It is likely, however, that respondents
vary considerably in their perception of benefits of hunt-
ing. For this reason, it is important to take preference
heterogeneity and variations in people’s socio-economic
situations into account. We do this in the two modeling
approaches that follow.
Table 2 presents the results of random parameters logit
model (RPL), a technique described in full in the Supple-
mentary Information. The RPL model allows us to take
both observed and unobserved potential determinants of
preference heterogeneity (variability) into account. Be-
cause we were interested in how preferences for poach-
ing change with respondents’ wealth level, we included
covariates which represent potential indicators of house-
hold wealth: the number of cattle currently owned, and
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Table 2 Random parameters logit model (RPL) results. Mean effects show the effects on utility for discrete changes in each attribute for the average
respondent away from the same baselines used in Table 1. Standard deviation parameters show the spread in preferences around this mean effect
for each attribute and level change. Interaction terms show how socio-economic characteristics “number of cattle owned” and “jobs in household”
co-determine the utility associated with different numbers of weeks spent hunting
Mean effect estimates Standard deviation estimates
Attribute Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
Number of cows = 1 0.2624 0.2281 0.6126 0.5037
Number of cows = 15 1.4826a 0.3201 0.0240 0.4927
Number of cows = 30 1.7851a 0.2781 1.2828a 0.3437
Wage from job = 8,000 TZS 0.9861a 0.2999 0.9440b 0.4330
Wage from job = 20,000 TZS 1.1712a 0.3912 1.5725a 0.5597
Wage from job = 60,000 TZS 2.4982a 0.4081 1.2871a 0.3590
Access to microcredit 0.8103a 0.1937 1.2905a 0.2804
Access to market 0.8357a 0.2008 1.0897a 0.2808
Weeks spent hunting = 1 0.9932a 0.3763 0.9204b 0.3753
Interaction with Cattle owned −0.0244c 0.0142 – –
Interaction with Jobs in household −3.0083 3.7474 – –
Weeks spent hunting = 8 0.9039c 0.5104 0.0191 0.3244
Interaction with Cattle owned −0.0259c 0.0156 – –
Interaction with Jobs in household −8.3303 5.2968 – –
Weeks spent hunting = 24 0.7045b 0.2876 0.4834 0.4238
Interaction with Cattle owned −0.0348b 0.0137 – –
Interaction with Jobs in household −1.2696 2.7841 – –
Risk associated with a hunting trip −1.1015a 0.3165 0.8873b 0.3868
Model properties
Log-likelihood −670.6538




a,b,cSignificance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels.
the number of people within a respondent’s household
that currently have a job. Of these, only the number of
cattle proved to have power in explaining preference dif-
ferences in a statistically significant way—the more cattle
a respondent owned, the less beneficial were additional
weeks spent hunting. Results show that as respondents
become wealthier (in terms of number of cattle owned),
the share of those who would find hunting worth their
while decreases.
As in the case of MNL, we are able to derive trade-off
rates between different attributes for the random parame-
ters model (Table 4, column 3). One week of hunting for
respondents who currently do not own cattle and have
no job income was equal to owning an additional 2.70
cows, or having about 50,000 TZS in additional job in-
come. Increases in cattle owned above 2.70 cows would
decrease time spent hunting by one week for respondents
who currently do not own cattle and with no job income.
Having access to microcredit was equivalent of 0.71 hunt-
ing week, whereas having road access to a market was
close to 0.74 of a week spent hunting.
To investigate the issue of preference heterogeneity
further, we estimated a latent class model (LC). This tech-
nique allows for the identification of a number of latent
classes of respondents with distinct preferences for hunt-
ing weeks and the risk associated with being arrested
while hunting (Table 3). Again, see the Supplementary
Information for more detail. We used the same indicators
of wealth as in the random parameters model as vari-
ables potentially explaining membership in one of two
LCes. Households with more cattle were more likely to
belong to LC one. The first LC of respondents (86% of
the sample) considered hunting trips less beneficial than
the second class (14% of the sample), whereas 24-week
hunting trips even had a negative effect on utility for
the former group. Members of the second LC were much
more concerned with the risk of being arrested. Finally,
in the case of members of class 2, one- and 8-week hunt-
ing trips appeared more beneficial than the risk associated
with them, indicating that there would be a net benefit
to such individuals of hunting illegally. Implied trade-off
rates are presented in columns 4 and 5 of Table 4. The
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Table 3 Latent class model (LC) results. Membership of individual households in either class is probabilistically determined by cattle owned and jobs in
household (“Explanatory variables of class probability”). For each latent class, the coefficient value shows the contribution to utility of each attribute level.
Due to sample size considerations, utility parameters for number of cows, wages, access to micro-credit and road access to market are constrained to





Attribute Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
Number of cows = 1 0.3021c 0.1644 0.3021c 0.1644
Number of cows = 15 0.9268a 0.2028 0.9268a 0.2028
Number of cows = 30 1.2879a 0.1541 1.2879a 0.1541
Wage from job = 8,000 TZS 0.8119a 0.2040 0.8119a 0.2040
Wage from job = 20,000 TZS 1.0238a 0.2400 1.0238a 0.2400
Wage from job = 60,000 TZS 1.8417a 0.2319 1.8417a 0.2319
Access to microcredit 0.6113a 0.1165 0.6113a 0.1165
Access to market 0.6018a 0.1269 0.6018a 0.1269
Weeks spent hunting = 1 0.1773 0.2475 3.3775b 1.6098
Weeks spent hunting = 8 0.1152 0.3328 3.8162b 1.8210
Weeks spent hunting = 24 −0.0464 0.1922 2.0434b 1.0309
Risk associated with a hunting trip −0.3021a 0.1644 −2.6780b 1.1680
Explanatory variables of class probability
Coefficient Std. error
Constant 0.7341 0.8955
Cattle owned 0.2420c 0.1393
Jobs in household 0.3330 0.9839
Model properties
Log-likelihood −688.8595




a,b,c Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels.
lower value associated with hunting trips by the mem-
bers of class 1 is reflected in the trade-offs they are will-
ing to make in comparison with the members of class 2.
The implication is that increases in cattle or wage-earning
options will only be effective in deterring illegal hunting
activity for households who are more likely to belong to
LC two.
Discussion
Taken at face value, our findings suggest that, particu-
larly increases in cattle or wages, but also improved ac-
cess to markets or microcredit, would all reduce illegal
hunting, in that households could reduce hunting activ-
ity with no decrease in well-being (utility) levels if these
changes in other livelihood sources took place. How-
ever, the rates of trade-off between illegal hunting (in
terms of the net benefit from this activity to individu-
als) and other sources of household livelihood support
varied significantly across households and livelihood op-
tions. This variation was partly explained by the num-
ber of cattle owned by the household. We can quantify
these trade-off rates, and show what increases in cattle
or wages would compensate for a given reduction in ille-
gal hunting activity. We also find that evaluations of the
risk of being arrested while hunting illegally vary across
households (Table 3), and that increase in this risk do
not decrease utility once risk rises above a rather low
threshold.
Current policies on reducing illegal bushmeat hunt-
ing in the Serengeti include a wide range of approaches,
such as improved law enforcement, support for alterna-
tive income sources through microcredit schemes, the es-
tablishment of wildlife management areas, improving the
availability of alternative protein sources such as chicken
and fish, conservation awareness campaigns, and the pro-
vision of benefits to communities by the national park
authority such as schools and health dispensaries. Our
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Table 4 Trade-off rates for livelihood attributes relative to number of weeks spent illegal hunting. Values are derived from Tables 1–3 as the ratio of the
utility parameter for number of cows, job income, access to microcredit and access to market to the utility parameter for 1 week of hunting per year
MNL RPLa LC (class 1) LC (class 2)
No. of cows for 1 hunting week 1.4725 2.6987 0.4665 9.6819
Job income (in thousands of TZS) for 1 hunting week 3.5939 5.0815 1.0352 21.4825
Hunting weeks for access to microcredit 0.8480 0.7136 3.2204 0.1552
Hunting weeks for access to market 0.8450 0.7360 3.1702 0.1528
aFor respondents who currently do not own cattle or job income.
results suggest that this range of options should be
extended by measures which boost livestock numbers
owned by households and wage earning opportunities.
However, the effectiveness of these options will vary
across households. Whilst the trade-offs between time
spent hunting and other livelihood attributes were com-
puted based on hypothetical choices, they give important
pointers for conservation policies and projects.
For most respondents, stricter law enforcement does
seem to act as a deterrent—however, as the persistence
of bushmeat hunting shows, this effect is obviously not
strong enough to prevent hunting across the entire pop-
ulation of western Serengeti. Although wealthier house-
holds tend to attribute less utility to hunting than less
well-off households, they also seem to be less concerned
about the risk of being caught. This means that poli-
cies that increase wealth, for example, through micro-
credits and the creation of job opportunities, can help
to reduce hunting. However, at the same time, a spe-
cialization of well-off hunters who commercially harvest
large amounts of bushmeat and who have the financial
means to cope with the risk of being arrested needs to be
prevented.
The heterogeneity in utility derived from hunting sug-
gests that if bushmeat hunting is to be reduced, inter-
ventions are required that combine the creation of al-
ternative income sources with stricter law enforcement
that cannot be circumvented by financial means. In ad-
dition, qualitative research in the same study site points
at the strong role of women in encouraging bushmeat
hunting, as they highly value the access to meat and
cash provided by hunters (Lowassa et al.). This suggests
that alternative income sources have to be sufficiently at-
tractive to compete with the opportunities provided by
hunting. Our finding that, on average, our respondents
would trade-off one week of hunting for an additional
50,000 TZS of wages per month (Table 4, RPL) suggests
that substantial changes in job availability would have
to happen in the region: only 15% of the households
in our sample had one or more members with regu-
lar jobs, whereas a waitress in a small cafe´ in the dis-
trict town currently earns only 20–25,000 TZS. In ad-
dition, economic development in western Serengeti (as
elsewhere) implies that demand for cash will likely rise
in the near future (Lowassa et al.). Policy instruments will
thus have to address not only the status quo, but also ac-
commodate future increases in income and well-being,
in addition to the overall sustainability of alternative in-
come sources such as intensified livestock husbandry or
cash crop cultivation, an aspect that our study did not
address.
Our study adds to the existing quantitative research
into bushmeat hunting as it investigates hunting in its
livelihood context rather than as an isolated activity, and
conceptualizes hunting as part of a package of livelihood
strategies. Although our representation of livelihood op-
tions in western Serengeti was by no means complete,
our approach allowed us to explore the trade-offs made
by households in greater depth than conventional house-
hold surveys. One of the major problems in studying il-
legal activities is the lack of reliable market and survey
data and the reluctance of households in answering di-
rect questions about poaching (e.g., St. John et al. 2011).
Our choice experiment is an attempt to go around this
problem, by including time spent hunting—the sensitive
variable—as one of the attributes whose level had to be
traded-off by respondents when choosing their combina-
tions of attributes levels which maximize their utility. In
addition, the use of choice experiments as a stated pref-
erence technique enabled us to examine behavioral in-
tentions of a random sample of the population rather
than explaining hunting ex-post, as, for example, inter-
views of arrested hunters do. Using choice experiments in
the manner employed here avoided asking respondents
directly about their participation in illegal activities, as
hunting was embedded as just one option across a range
of livelihood strategies. However, respondents may still
have chosen options with high levels of illegal hunting
less often than they would in reality if they were worried
about signaling actual participation to the researchers, al-
though pre- and pilot tests did not give any indication
that this might have been the case.
Finally, although our results point to the desirabil-
ity of policies towards reducing illegal hunting being
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differentiated according to household wealth levels, we
were not able to quantify the additional costs of imple-
menting policy options differentiated in this way relative
to simpler, undifferentiated policies.
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Endnote
1We remind the reader that since the attribute in the util-
ity function is number of weeks spent hunting per year,
every reference to week(s) spent hunting are relative to
a given year.
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